Although such benefits would automatically have been granted with respect to the wife of a male member of the uniformed services, appellant's application was denied because she failed to demonstrate that her husband was dependent on her for more than one-half of his support.Although the legislative history of these statutes sheds virtually no light on the purposes underlying the differential treatment accorded male and female members.At the outset, appellants contend that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race.In Reed, the Court considered the constitutionality of an Idaho statute providing that, when two individuals are otherwise equally entitled to appointment as administrator of an estate, the male applicant must be preferred to the female.

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the judgment.I agree that the challenged statutes constitute an unconstitutional discrimination against servicewomen in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but I cannot join the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, which would hold that all classifications based upon sex, "like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin," are "inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." 93 S.Ct. The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of this precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratification by the States. U.S., at 77 411 U.S. 677. Appellant claimed that this statute, by giving a mandatory preference to males over females without regard to their individual qualifications, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The Court noted that the Idaho statute "provides that different treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a classification subject,In an effort to meet this standard, appellee contended that the statutory scheme was a reasonable measure designed to reduce the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests. See Gruenwald v. Gardner,In 1971, 43% of all women over the age of 16 were in the labor force, and 18% of all women worked full time 12 months per year. It is unnecessary for the Court in this case to.There is another, and I find compelling, reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the strictest test of judicial scrutiny. JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join.The question before us concerns the right of a female member of the uniformed services.In an effort to attract career personnel through reenlistment, Congress established, in 37 U.S.C. 405 No.

Justice STEWART concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. . ." And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. 411 U.S. 677. And, as appellants point out, this underrepresentation is present throughout all levels of our State and Federal Government. If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent the will of the people accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.

Reed v. Reed.Mr. By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment.

similarly situated." But democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in the restraint of the Court is impaired, when we appear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political importance at the very time they are under consideration within the prescribed constitutional processes.Because of the division among the Justices, including a very brief dissent from Justice William Rehnquist, the level of judicial scrutiny for sex-based classifications was left unsettled. 1071 et seq., was enacted as the Dependents' Medical Care Act of 1956. On May 14, 1973, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Frontiero v.Richardson, a case that furthered the cause of gender equality within the U.S. military and, indeed, the United States.. Thus, the Government argues that Congress might reasonably have concluded that it would be both cheaper and easier simply conclusively to presume that wives of male members are financially dependent upon their husbands, while burdening female members with the task of establishing dependency in fact.The Government offers no concrete evidence, however, tending to support its view that such differential treatment in fact saves the Government any money. It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.There are times when this Court, under our system, cannot avoid a constitutional decision on issues which normally should be resolved by the elected representatives of the people. Sharron Frontiero was a Lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force who applied for housing benefits for her husband, whom she claimed as a dependent.