For example, national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) established under CAA section 109 address concentrations of substances in the ambient air and the related public health and welfare problems. As is often the case, the questions of causation and redressability overlap. App. The limitation of the judicial power to cases and controversies “is crucial in maintaining the tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution.”.To be fair, it is not the first time the Court has done so. This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of.Just as Georgia’s “independent interest … in all the earth and air within its domain” supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today. While the statute does condition the exercise of EPA’s authority on its formation of a “judgment,”.If EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the agency to regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor vehicles.EPA has refused to comply with this clear statutory command. 232. Furthermore, the Petitioners filed substantial scientific evidence that the.If the statutory definition of the CAA includes carbon dioxide, then the Federal courts would have no discretion to reach any other conclusion. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can regulate greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, as “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act. 52930.I simply cannot conceive of what else the Court would like EPA to say.Even before reaching its discussion of the word “judgment,” the Court makes another significant error when it concludes that “§202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act,“Air pollutant” is defined by the Act as “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, … substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”,The Court’s analysis faithfully follows the argument advanced by petitioners, which focuses on the word “including” in the statutory definition of “air pollutant.” See Brief for Petitioners 13–14. 52929–52931 (footnote omitted).The Court dismisses this analysis as “rest[ing] on reasoning divorced from the statutory text.”,EPA’s interpretation of the discretion conferred by the statutory reference to “its judgment” is not only reasonable, it is the most natural reading of the text. See 68 Fed. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit 12–17. We therefore hold that petitioners have standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.The scope of our review of the merits of the statutory issues is narrow.

H. Farnsworth, M. Lackmann, … S. Stacker,S. Unavoidably, climate change raises important foreign policy issues, and it is the President’s prerogative to address them.” 68 Fed. “Welfare” is also defined broadly: among other things, it includes “effects on … weather … and climate.” §7602(h).When Congress enacted these provisions, the study of climate change was in its infancy.In the late 1970’s, the Federal Government began devoting serious attention to the possibility that carbon dioxide emissions associated with human activity could provoke climate change. Such a conclusion involves no judgment on whether global warming exists, what causes it, or the extent of the problem. See §1103(c),Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of climate change and concluding that it would therefore be better not to regulate at this time.

Because local greenhouse gas emissions disperse throughout the atmosphere and remain there for anywhere from 50 to 200 years, it is global emissions data that are relevant. You are currently offline. See,These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing standards applicable to the “emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in [the Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”,With that in mind, it is clear that petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the adversarial process. Since the inception of the Act, EPA has used these provisions to address air pollution problems that occur primarily at ground level or near the surface of the earth. L. 89–272, §101(8),“The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare … .”.The Act defines “air pollutant” to include “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive … substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.” §7602(g). Syllabus [HTML] [PDF] Opinion, Stevens [HTML] [PDF] Dissent, Roberts [HTML] [PDF] Dissent, Scalia [HTML] [PDF] MASSACHUSETTS et al. See 68 Fed. EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both “actual” and “imminent,” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560, and there is a “substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that risk, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79.